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Abstract—The bounded storage model restricts the memory of
an adversary in a cryptographic protocol, rather than restricting
its computational power, making information theoretically secure
protocols feasible. We present the first protocols for commitment
and oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model with errors,
i.e., the model where the public random sources available to
the two parties are not exactly the same, but instead are only
required to have a small Hamming distance between themselves.
Commitment and oblivious transfer protocols were known pre-
viously only for the error-free variant of the bounded storage
model, which is harder to realize.
Index Terms—Bounded storage model, commitment, oblivious
transfer, unconditional security, error correction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Commitment schemes are fundamental building blocks of
modern cryptography. They are important in the construction
of protocols such as identification protocols [2], contract
signing [3], zero-knowledge proofs [4], coin flipping over
the phone [5], and more generally in two- and multi-party
computation protocols [6], [7]. A commitment scheme is a
two-stage protocol between two parties, Alice and Bob. First
they execute the commit stage, in which Alice chooses a value
v as input and commits to it. Later, they execute the open
stage, in which Alice reveals v to Bob. For the protocol to
be secure, it must satisfy two conditions: the hiding property,
which means that Bob cannot learn any information about v
before the open stage, and the binding property, which means
that after the commit phase, Alice cannot change v without
that being detected by Bob.
Oblivious transfer (OT) is another essential primitive for
two- and multi-party computation. It is a two-party protocol
in which Alice inputs two strings s0 and s1, and Bob inputs
a bit c. Bob’s output is the string sc. The protocol is secure if
Alice never learns the choice bit c and Bob does not learn any
information about s1−c. OT is a fundamental building block
for multi-party computation and can be used to realize any
secure two-party computation [8], [9].
Unconditionally secure commitment and OT are impos-
sible in the setting where the parties only communicate
through noiseless channels (even if quantum channels are
available [10]). However, both of them are possible in the
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context of computational security (in which the adversaries are
restricted to be polynomial-time Turing machines), as long as
computational hardness assumptions are made. Commitment
can be obtained using generic assumptions such as the ex-
istence of pseudorandom generator [11] or (more efficiently)
assuming the hardness of various specific computational prob-
lems [12], [5], [13]. OT can be obtained from dense trapdoor
permutations [14] (which is conjectured to be stronger than
pseudorandom generators) or assuming the hardness of many
specific computational problems [15], [16], [17], [18], [19],
[20], [21], [22].
Physical assumptions, such as the existence of noisy chan-
nels, enable one to obtain unconditional security for com-
mitment and OT protocols. In this scenario the problem was
studied from both the theoretical [23], [24], [25], [26], [27],
[28], [29] and the efficient protocol designing [30], [31], [32],
[33] points of view.
In this paper, we consider a different setting, the so called
bounded storage model (BSM) [34], in which the adversary is
assumed to have bounded memory.
A. The Bounded Storage Model
The bounded storage model assumes that both parties have
access to a public random string, and that a dishonest party
cannot store the whole string. This string can be obtained from
a natural source, from a trusted third party, or, in some cases
even generated by one of the parties.
A variety of cryptographic tasks can be implemented in the
bounded storage model. Cachin and Maurer [35] proposed a
key agreement protocol in the bounded storage model in which
the parties have a small pre-shared key, and use it to select
bits from a public random source of size n. Key agreement in
this setting is always possible if the pre-shared key has size
proportional to log n, as long as the adversary has bounded
memory. They also proposed a protocol for key agreement
by public discussion (that is, without a pre-shared key) that
requires
√
kn (where k is the key length) samples from the
random source and is thus less practical. Later, Dziembowski
and Maurer [36] showed that this protocol is optimal, in the
sense that one cannot have key agreement by public discussion
in the bounded storage model with less than O(
√
n) samples.
The first OT protocol in the bounded storage model was
introduced by Cachin et al. [37]. Ding [38] and Hong et al. [39]
proposed improvements in a slightly different model. Ding et
al. [40] obtained the first constant-round protocol.
Shikata and Yamanaka [41] and independently Alves [42]
studied the problem of commitment in the bounded storage
model and provided protocols for it.
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2Unfortunately the bounded storage model assumes that there
exists a random source that can be reliably broadcast to all
parties, without errors in the transmission, and this is hard to
realize in practice.
Consider a scenario where a satellite broadcasts a very large
random string to be used in protocols in the bounded storage
model. In his Ph.D. thesis, Ding [43] made an analysis of
the practicality of this scenario, showing that an antenna with
a surface area of 10m2 can be used to receive random bits
from a geo-stationary satellite at rates up to 50 Gbps. Ding’s
analysis did not consider the fact that errors are introduced in
the string and that an adversary might be able to jam signal
received by a legitimate party. Our goal with this work is to
study two-party protocols under more realistic assumptions.
B. Our contribution
In this work, we consider a more general variant of the
BSM, in which errors are introduced in the public random
source in arbitrary positions. This setting captures the situation
in which the source is partially controlled by an adversary,
and also the situation in which there are errors due to noise
in the channel. It is only assumed that the fraction of errors,
relative to the length of the public string, is not too large. Ding
previously studied this model [44] in the context of secret key
extension protocols. These protocols can be modified, at the
cost of an efficiency loss, to handle the case of key agreement,
when no pre-shared key exists. He defined a general paradigm
for BSM randomness extraction schemes and also showed how
to incorporate error correction in key agreement extension by
using fuzzy extractors [45].
We give a brief introduction to the model and its notation
in order to state our results. A transmission phase is executed
prior to the realization of the protocols’ main part. In this
phase, Alice has access to a sample x ∈ {0, 1}n from an αn-
source X (a source with min-entropy at least αn), where 0 <
α < 1, and the Bob to x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n such that HD(x, x˜) ≤ δn,
where HD(·) represents the hamming distance. We assume that
an adversary (controlling either Alice or Bob) has complete
control on where to insert the differences between the strings
x and x˜, thus capturing both the situation where the source
is noisy and the situation where an adversary controls part of
the source.
We propose the first protocols for bit commitment and OT
in the BSM with errors, thus extending the results of [44]
to the case of two-party secure protocols. We show that the
techniques introduced by [44] originally in the context of key
extension give us efficient protocols for implementing OT. Our
OT protocol assumes a memory bounded Bob (i.e., he is able
to store at most γn bits for γ < α), but no limitation is put
on Alice’s memory. It works based on an efficient linear error
correcting code proposed in [46] with rate β and achieving the
Zyablov bound [47]. We show that as long as β > 1−α−γ the
protocol works for noise levels δ as severe as (approximately)
max
β<β˜<1
(1− β˜)y
2
,
where y is the unique value in [0, 1/2] so that h(y) = 1−β/β˜
and h(·) is the binary entropy function. In case a random linear
error correcting code is used an improved noise level can be
tolerated
h(2δ) < α− γ.
This improvement in the resilience comes at the price of mak-
ing the protocol inefficient from a computational complexity
point of view, given the intractability of decoding random
linear codes.
This OT protocol immediately gives us a commitment
scheme. However, using OT for obtaining commitment is not
a desirable solution. The communication, round and computa-
tional complexities of OT protocols are usually much higher
than the ones for commitment schemes. Moreover, it could be
the case that commitment protocols work for different ranges
of noise δ.
We propose a direct construction of a commitment protocol
that does not rely on the framework proposed by Ding [44],
does not use error correcting codes at all, implements string
commitment and has only one message from Bob to Alice.
Again, we assume that Bob has limited memory. No limita-
tions are imposed on Alice whatsoever. The protocol is very
efficient and simple and works for
h(δ) <
α− γ
2
.
We then show that it is possible to obtain a protocol that works
for a much larger range of noise
h(δ) < α− γ
at the cost of having one additional message in each direction
and by using a family of 4k-universal hash functions. Finally,
we show that the use of families of 4k-universal hash functions
can be avoided by imposing a memory bound on Alice, instead
of Bob. We note that being able to implement protocols in
the memory bounded by bounding any of the parties is an
important matter, particularly when one of the parties is much
more powerful than the other. This protocol is based on the
interactive hashing protocol of [40] and also works for
h(δ) < α− γ,
but has extra rounds of communication and implements bit
rather than string commitment.
The techniques we use in our results are standard in
the field: extractors, error-correcting codes, typicality tests,
sampling, etc. However, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time that these techniques are combined to obtain
commitment and OT protocols in the memory bounded model
with errors. Moreover, the study of how much adversarial
noise can be tolerated in this model and its relation to round
complexity is also original, as far as we know. Interestingly,
the noise levels tolerated by our protocols are different for
OT and commitment schemes. This contrasts sharply with the
noiseless situation where either one has every possible secure
two-party computation or nothing at all.
C. Overview
In Section II we present the main tools used in our protocols.
Section III explains the security model. Our commitment
3protocols are introduced in Section IV and the oblivious
transfer in Section V. A conference version of this work
appeared at the proceedings of ISIT 2014 [1] and only covered
the case of OT. In this full version a more detailed presentation
of the case of OT is presented and the case of commitment is
entirely new; the other sections are also extended accordingly.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use calligraphic letters for denoting domains of random
variables and other sets, upper case letters for random variables
and lower case letters for realizations of the random variables.
We deal solely with discrete random variables. The probability
mass function of a random variable X will be denoted by PX .
The set {1, . . . , n} will be written as [n]. If x = (x1, . . . , xn)
is a sequence and S = {s1, . . . , st} ⊆ [n], xS denotes the
sequence (xs1 , . . . , xst). u
$← U denotes that u is drawn
from the uniform distribution over the set U and Ur is
the uniformly-distributed r-bit random variable. y $← F(x)
denotes the act of running the probabilistic algorithm F with
input x and obtaining the output y. y ← F(x) is similarly
used for deterministic algorithms.
If x and y are strings, HD(x, y) denotes their Hamming
distance (that is, the number of positions in which they differ)
and x⊕ y their bitwise exclusive or. Let log x denote the log-
arithm of x in base 2. The binary entropy function is denoted
by h: for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, h(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x).
By convention, 0 log 0 = 0. H(X) denotes the entropy of X
and I(X;Y ) the mutual information between X and Y .
The statistical distance is a measure of the distance between
two probability distributions. Here, we state its definition for
the case of discrete probabilities.
Definition 2.1 (Statistical distance): The statistical distance
‖PX − PY ‖ between two probability mass functions PX , PY
over an alphabet X is defined as
‖PX − PY ‖ = max
A⊆X
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈A
PX(x)− PY (x)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
We say PX and PY are ε-close if ‖PX − PY ‖ ≤ ε.
The main entropy measure in this work is the min-entropy.
Definition 2.2 (Min-entropy): Let PXY be a probability
mass function over X × Y . The min-entropy of X , denoted
by H∞(X), and the conditional min-entropy of X given Y ,
denoted by H∞(X|Y ), are respectively defined as
H∞(X) = min
x∈X
(− logPX(x)) and
H∞(X|Y ) = min
y∈Y
min
x∈X
(− logPX|Y=y(x)).
X is called a k-source if H∞(X) ≥ k.
The conditional min-entropy H∞(X|Y ) measures the ex-
tractable private randomness from the variable X , given the
correlated random variable Y possessed by an adversary.
The min-entropy has the problem of being sensitive to small
changes in the probability mass function and due to this fact
the notion of smooth min-entropy [48] will be used (please
refer to the Appendix for a longer discussion about the advan-
tages of the smooth variants for cryptographic applications).
Definition 2.3 (Smooth min-entropy): Let ε > 0 and PXY
be a probability mass functions. The ε-smooth min-entropy of
X given Y is defined by
Hε∞(X|Y ) = max
X′Y ′:‖PX′Y ′−PXY ‖≤ε
H∞(X ′|Y ′).
Intuitively, the smooth min-entropy is the maximum min-
entropy in the neighborhood of the probability mass function.
Similarly, we also define the max-entropy and its smooth
version.
Definition 2.4 ((Smooth) Max-entropy): The max-entropy is
defined as
H0(X) = log |{x ∈ X|PX(x) > 0}|
and its conditional version is given by
H0(X|Y ) = max
y
H0(X|Y = y).
The smooth variants are defined as
Hε0(X) = min
X′:‖PX′−PX‖≤ε
H0(X
′) and
Hε0(X|Y ) = min
X′Y ′:‖PX′Y ′−PXY ‖≤ε
H0(X
′|Y ′).
The following inequalities are smooth min-entropy ana-
logues of the chain rule for conditional Shannon entropy.
Lemma 2.5 ([48]): Let ε, ε′, ε′′ > 0 and PXY Z be a
tripartite probability mass function. Then
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X,Y |Z) ≥ Hε∞(X|Y, Z) +Hε
′
∞(Y |Z) and
Hε∞(X,Y |Z) < Hε+ε
′+ε′′
∞ (X|Y,Z) +Hε
′′
0 (Y |Z)
+ log(1/ε′).
The notion of min-entropy rate and a few results regarding
its preservation will be used subsequently.
Definition 2.6 (Min-entropy rate): Let X be a random vari-
able with an alphabet X , Y be an arbitrary random variable,
and ε ≥ 0. The min-entropy rate Rε∞(X|Y ) is defined as
Rε∞(X|Y ) =
Hε∞(X|Y )
log |X | .
The following lemma follows by using Lemma 3.16 in
[49] as a first step and some easy extra steps to obtain an
inequality in terms of the min-entropy rate alone. It says that a
source with high min-entropy also has high min-entropy when
conditioned on a correlated short string. This lemma is what
makes the bounded storage assumption useful: it implies that
a memory bounded adversary has limited information about a
string sampled from the public random string.
Lemma 2.7: Let X ∈ {0, 1}n such that Rε∞(X) ≥ ρ and Y
be a random variable over {0, 1}φn. Fix ε′ > 0. Then
Rε
′+
√
8ε
∞ (X|Y ) ≥ ρ− φ−
1 + log(1/ε′)
n
.
Proof: Let ψ = ρ−φ− 1+log(1/ε′)n . By lemma 3.16 in [49]
we have that if Rε∞(X) ≥ ρ then
Pr
y
$←Y
[
R
√
2ε
∞ (X|Y = y) ≥ ψ
]
≥ 1− ε′ −
√
2ε.
4To get the desired result, let G = {y ∈ Y|R
√
2ε
∞ (X|Y =
y) ≥ ψ} and PXY be the joint probability distribution of
X and Y . Let P ′XY be the distribution that is
√
2ε-close to
PXY and is such that P ′(X = x|Y = y) ≤ 2−ψn for any
x ∈ X , y ∈ G. Let P ′′XY be obtained by letting P ′′(X|Y =
y) = P ′(X|Y = y) for y ∈ G and defining P ′′(X = x|Y =
y) = 2−n for any x ∈ X , y /∈ G. As Pr [G ] ≥ 1−ε′−√2ε, it
holds that ‖P ′′XY −P ′XY ‖ ≤ ε′+
√
2ε and so ‖P ′′XY −PXY ‖ ≤
ε′ + 2
√
2ε. Since P ′′(X = x|Y = y) ≤ 2−ψn for every
x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , the lemma follows.
A. Averaging Samplers and Randomness Extractors
The sample-then-extract paradigm is usually employed in
the bounded storage model - first some positions of the source
are sampled and then an extractor is applied on these positions.
Note that due to the assumption that it is infeasible to store the
whole source string (the memory bound), it is not possible to
apply an extractor to the complete string at once, the extractor
needs to be locally computable [50]. In this context, averaging
samplers [51], [52], [53] are a fundamental tool. Intuitively,
averaging samplers produce samples such that the average
value of any function applied to the sampled string is roughly
the same as the average when taken over the original string.
Definition 2.8 (Averaging sampler): A function Samp :
{0, 1}r → [n]t is an (µ, ν, ε)-averaging sampler if for every
function f : [n] → [0, 1] with average
∑n
i=1 f(i)
n ≥ µ it holds
that
Pr
S $←Samp(Ur)
[
1
t
∑
i∈S
f(i) ≤ µ− ν
]
≤ ε.
Averaging samplers enjoy several useful properties. Particu-
larly important to this work is the fact that averaging samplers
roughly preserve the min-entropy rate.
Lemma 2.9 ([50]): Let X ∈ {0, 1}n be such that
R∞(X|Y ) ≥ ρ. Let τ be such that 1 ≥ ρ ≥ 3τ > 0
and Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]t be an (µ, ν, ε)-averaging sam-
pler with distinct samples for µ = (ρ − 2τ)/ log(1/τ) and
ν = τ/ log(1/τ). Then for S $← Samp(Ur)
Rε
′
∞(X
S |S, Y ) ≥ ρ− 3τ,
where ε′ = ε+ 2−Ω(τn).
For t < n, the uniform distribution over subsets of [n] of
size t is an averaging sampler, also called the (n, t)-random
subset sampler.
Lemma 2.10: Let 0 < t < n. For any µ, ν > 0, the (n, t)-
random subset sampler is a (µ, ν, e−tν
2/2)-averaging sampler.
Proof: It is just a restatement of Lemma 5.5 in [54].
A randomness extractor is a function that takes a string with
high min-entropy as an input and outputs a string that is close
(in the statistical distance sense) to a uniformly distributed
string.
Definition 2.11 (Strong extractor): A function
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-strong
extractor if for every k-source X , we have
‖PExt(X,Ur),Ur − PUm,Ur‖ ≤ ε.
The following lemma specifies the parameters of an explicit
strong extractor construction [53].
Lemma 2.12 ([53]): Let ρ, ψ > 0 be arbitrary con-
stants. For every n ∈ N and every ε > e−n/2O(log∗ n) ,
there is an explicit construction of a (ρn, ε)-strong extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}m with m = (1− ψ)ρn and
r = O(log n+ log(1/ε)).
The OT protocol presented in this work uses a variant of a
strong extractor called a fuzzy extractor [45]. Intuitively, fuzzy
extractors are noise-resilient extractors, that is, extractors such
that the extracted string can be reproduced by any party with
a string that is close (in the Hamming distance sense) to the
original source.
Definition 2.13 (Fuzzy extractor): A pair of functions
Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}r → {0, 1}m×{0, 1}q , Rec : {0, 1}n×
{0, 1}r × {0, 1}q → {0, 1}m is an (k, ε, δ, β)-fuzzy extractor
if:
• For every κ-source X ∈ {0, 1}`, (Y,Q) ← Ext(X,Ur).
Then ‖PY UrQ − Um × PUrQ‖ ≤ ε.
• For every x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}` such that HD(x, x′) ≤ δ`, let
r
$← Ur, (y, q) ← Ext(x, r). Then it should hold that
Pr [Rec(x′, r, q) = y ] ≥ 1− β.
Fuzzy extractors are a special case of one-way key-
agreement schemes [55], [56]. Ultimately they are equivalent
to performing information reconciliation followed by privacy
amplification [57]. Since there is a restriction to close strings
with respect to the Hamming distance, syndrome-based fuzzy
extractors can be used, as summarized in the following lemma
from Ding [44].
Lemma 2.14 ([44]): Let 1 ≥ ρ, ψ > 0 and 1/4 > δ > 0
be arbitrary constants. There is a constant β, depending on
δ, such that for every sufficiently large n ∈ N, and every
ε > e−n/2
O(log∗ n)
, there exists an explicit construction of a
(ρn, ε, δ, 0)-fuzzy extractor (Ext,Rec), where Ext is of the
form Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}r → {0, 1}m × {0, 1}p with
m = (1− ψ)ρn,
r = O
(
log n+ log
1
ε
)
,
p ≤ 1− β
(1− ψ)ρm.
Remark 2.15: The parameters β, δ refer to the error-
correcting code used in the construction, specifically, a code of
size n with rate β that can correct δn errors. It is known [58]
that, for a given υ with 0 < υ < 1/2 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1− h(υ),
there exists a random linear code with minimum distance υn
and β ≥ 1− h(υ)− µ (i.e., it matches the Gilbert-Varshamov
bound). However this construction has no known efficient
decoding. We can instead use the concatenated solution in
Theorem 4 of [46], which achieves the Zyablov bound [47].
The construction provides a code with linear-time encoding
and decoding such that, for a given 0 < β < 1 and µ > 0,
can correct δn errors, where
δ ≥ max
β<β˜<1
(1− β˜ − µ)y
2
and y is the unique number in [0, 1/2] with h(y) = 1− β/β˜.
5B. Interactive Hashing and Binary Encoding of Subsets
Interactive hashing was initially introduced in the context
of computationally secure cryptography [59], but was later
generalized to the information-theoretic setting, and is par-
ticularly useful in the context of designing oblivious transfer
[37], [40], [60], [61], [28] and commitment protocols [41] with
unconditional security. In this primitive Bob inputs a string
w ∈ {0, 1}m and both Alice and Bob receive as output two
strings w0, w1 ∈ {0, 1}m such that w0 6= w1. The correctness
requirement is that one of the two output strings, wd, should
be equal to w. The security guarantee for Alice is that one
of the strings should be effectively beyond the control of (a
malicious) Bob. On the other hand, the security guarantee for
Bob states that (a malicious) Alice should not be able to learn
d.
A variety of protocols for realizing interactive hashing have
been proposed [37], [40], [62]. In this work interactive hashing
is used as a black box since the security of our protocols does
not depend on particular features of the interactive hashing
protocol used, but only on its security properties.
Definition 2.16 (Interactive hashing): Interactive hashing is
a protocol between Alice and Bob in which only Bob has an
input w ∈ {0, 1}m, and both parties output w0, w1 ∈ {0, 1}m
such that wd = w for some d ∈ {0, 1}. The protocol is called
an η-uniform (t, θ)-secure interactive hashing protocol if:
1) If both parties are honest, then the random variable
W1−d is close to completely random, i.e., W1−d is η-
close to the uniform distribution on the 2m − 1 strings
different from wd.
2) Alice’s view (possibly a malicious Alice) of the protocol
is independent of d. Let viewIHAlice(W ) be Alice’s view
of the protocol when the input is the random variable
W . Then{
viewIHAlice(W )|W =W0
}
=
{
viewIHAlice(W )|W =W1
}
.
3) For any T ⊂ {0, 1}m such that |T | ≤ 2t, it should
hold that after the protocol execution between an honest
Alice and a possibly malicious Bob,
Pr [W0,W1 ∈ T ] ≤ θ,
where the probability is over the parties’ randomness.
By allowing W1−d to be distributed only closely to uniform,
this definition is weaker than the one usually given in the
literature [61]. It is, however, enough to prove security of our
oblivious transfer protocol. This more general definition allows
for the possibility of using the constant-round protocol of Ding
et al. [40] for interactive hashing.
Lemma 2.17 ([40]): Let t,m be positive integers such that
t ≥ logm + 2. Then there exists a four-message (2−m)-
uniform (t, 2−(m−t)+O(logm))-secure interactive hashing pro-
tocol.
The following lemma is a result by [62]. It is 0-uniform (that
is, W1−d is distributed uniformly), and achieves near-optimal
security [61], but has the disadvantage of taking m−1 rounds
to execute.
Lemma 2.18 ([62]): There exists a 0-uniform (t, a ·
2−(m−t))-secure interactive hashing protocol for some con-
stant a > 0.
A secure interactive hashing scheme guarantees that one
of the outputs is random; however, in the oblivious transfer
protocols, the two binary strings are not used directly, but as
encodings of subsets of sequences. Thus for the protocol to
succeed, both outputs need to be valid encodings of subsets of(
[n]
`
)
. The original protocol of Cachin et al. [37] for oblivious
transfer used an encoding scheme that has probability of
success 1/2, thus requiring that the protocol be repeated
several times to guarantee correctness. Later, Ding et al. [40]
proposed a “dense” encoding of subsets, ensuring that most
m-bit strings are valid encodings. More precisely, they showed
the following result.
Lemma 2.19 ([40]): Let ` ≤ n, m ≥ dlog (n`)e, tm =
b2m/(n`)c. Then there exists an injective mapping F : ([n]` )×
[tm]→ [2m] with | Im(F )| > 2m −
(
n
`
)
.
C. Miscellaneous
Universal hash functions were introduced by Carter and
Wegman [63] and are very useful in cryptography.
Definition 2.20 (t-universal hash functions): A family of
functions G = {g : H → L} is called a family of t-universal
hash functions if for g $← G and for any x1, . . . , xt ∈ H, the
induced distribution on (g(x1), . . . , g(xt)) is uniform over Lt.
For any H = {0, 1}h and L = {0, 1}`, there exists a
t-universal family of hash functions for which the function
description has size poly(h, t) bits, and the sampling and
computing times are in poly(h, t).
The following is a basic fact that follows from simple
counting.
Lemma 2.21: Let 0 ≤ δ < 1/2 and let x, y ∈ {0, 1}n such
that HD(x, y) ≤ δn and H∞(X) ≥ αn where 0 < α < 1.
Then H∞(Y ) ≥ (α− h(δ))n.
The next lemma shows that the restrictions of two tuples
to random subsets of their positions have relative Hamming
distances that are close to the one between the entire tuples.
Lemma 2.22: Let x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, S be a random subset
of [n] of size r and consider any ν ∈ [0, 1]. On one hand,
if HD(x, y) ≤ δn, then HD(xS , yS) < (δ + ν)r except with
probability e−rν
2/2. On the other hand, if HD(x, y) ≥ δn,
then HD(xS , yS) > (δ− ν)r except with probability e−rν2/2.
Proof: Lets begin with the first part of the Lemma. By
Lemma 2.10, a random subset sampler is an (µ, ν, e−rν
2/2)-
averaging sampler for any µ, ν > 0. Hence for any f : [n]→
[0, 1] with 1n
∑n
i=1 f(i) ≥ µ
Pr
[
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
f(i) ≤ µ− ν
]
≤ e−rν2/2, (1)
Let
f(i) =
{
0, if xi 6= yi,
1, otherwise.
6Fix µ = 1− δ. Note that 1|S|
∑
i∈S f(i) = 1− HD(x
S ,yS)
r and
1
n
∑n
i=1 f(i) = 1− HD(x,y)n ≥ µ. Thus by Equation (1)
e−rν
2/2 ≥ Pr
[
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
f(i) ≤ µ− ν
]
= Pr
[
1− HD(x
S , yS)
r
≤ 1− δ − ν
]
= Pr
[
HD(xS , yS) ≥ (δ + ν)r ],
which proves the first part of the Lemma.
The second part of the Lemma uses the same idea, but now
the function f is
f(i) =
{
0, if xi = yi,
1, otherwise.
Fixing µ = δ it holds that 1|S|
∑
i∈S f(i) =
HD(xS ,yS)
r and
1
n
∑n
i=1 f(i) =
HD(x,y)
n ≥ µ and hence
e−rν
2/2 ≥ Pr
[
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
f(i) ≤ µ− ν
]
= Pr
[
HD(xS , yS)
r
≤ δ − ν
]
= Pr
[
HD(xS , yS) ≤ (δ − ν)r ],
which finishes the proof of the lemma.
The following statement of the birthday paradox is standard.
Lemma 2.23: Let A,B ⊂ [n], chosen independently at
random, with |A| = |B| = 2√`n. Then
Pr[|A ∩ B| < `] < e−`/4.
Proof: See corollary 3 in [38].
The following useful lemma will also be needed in the
subsequent sections.
Lemma 2.24 ([64]): Let 0 < σ < 1/2. Then
σk∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
≤ 2h(σ)k.
The following lemma by Rompel will be also useful.
Lemma 2.25 ([65]): Suppose t is a positive even integer,
X1, · · · , Xu are t-wise independent random variables taking
values in the range [0, 1], X =
∑u
i=1Xi, µ = E[X], and
A > 0. Then
Pr [ |X − µ| > A ] < O
((
tµ+ t2
A2
)t/2)
.
III. SECURITY MODEL
A. Bounded Storage Model
We work in a two-party scenario, where two players (Alice
and Bob) engage in cryptographic protocols, more specifically
commitment and oblivious transfer protocols. We assume that
one of the players has an upper bound on the available
memory. As usual in the cryptographic literature, we assume
an adversary that can corrupt either party. We will call a
corrupted party dishonest. Parties that have not been corrupted
will be called honest.
Cryptographic protocols in the bounded storage model run a
transmission phase prior to their main part. We briefly describe
this phase here.
Transmission Phase: In this phase, the sender (Alice) has
access to a sample x ∈ {0, 1}n from an αn-source X ,
where 0 < α < 1, and the receiver (Bob) to x˜ ∈ {0, 1}n
such that HD(x, x˜) ≤ δn. Note that this captures both the
situation where the source is noisy and the situation where an
adversary controls part of the source. In the bounded storage
model normally a memory bound is imposed on both parties
during this phase, but we are able to prove the security of
our protocols while imposing a memory bound on only one
of them (which one depends on the specific protocol). For a
memory bounded Alice, she computes a randomized function
f(x) with output size at most γn for γ < α, stores its output
and discards x. Similarly, for a memory bounded Bob, he
computes a randomized function f˜(x˜) with output size at
most γn for γ < α, stores its output and discards x˜. We
should mention that in all the proposed protocol the honest
parties only have to store a bounded amount of information.
It should also be highlighted that even if the memory bounded
party gains infinite storage power after the transmission phase
is over and the source is not available anymore, this does
not affect the security of the protocol, i.e., it has everlasting
security.
B. Secure Commitment
The main part of a commitment protocol has two phases:
commitment and opening.
Commitment Phase: Alice has an input string v ∈ V
(which is a realization of a random variable V ) that she wants
to commit to. The parties exchange messages, possibly in
several rounds. Let transCP(v) denote all the communication
in this phase and viewCPBob(v) Bob’s view at the end of
this phase. These random variables are a function of v, the
functions that the parties computed from the public random
source and the parties’ local randomness.
Opening Phase: Alice sends Bob the string v˜ that she
claims she committed to. The parties can then exchange
messages in several rounds. Let transOP(v˜) denote all the
communication in this phase. In the end Bob performs a test
test
(
viewCPBob(v), trans
OP(v˜)
)
that outputs 1 if Bob accepts Alice’s commitment and 0
otherwise.
Security. A commitment protocol is called (λC, λH, λB)-
secure if it satisfies the following properties:
1) λC-correct: if Alice and Bob are honest, then for every
possible v, the probability that the protocol aborts is at
most λC
Pr
[
no aborts and test
(
viewCPBob(v), trans
OP(v)
)
= 1
]
≥ 1− λC.
72) λH-hiding: if Alice is honest then Bob’s knowledge on
her committed value is at most λH,
I(V ; viewCPBob(V )|X˜) ≤ λH.
3) λB-binding: if Bob is honest, then there are no v and
v˜ 6= vˆ that can be successfully open,
Pr
[
test
(
viewCPBob(v), trans
OP(v˜)
)
= 1
]
≥ λB
and
Pr
[
test
(
viewCPBob(v), trans
OP(vˆ)
)
= 1
]
≥ λB.
C. Secure Oblivious Transfer
We use the definition of oblivious transfer presented in [40].
An oblivious transfer protocol is a protocol between two
players, Alice and Bob, in which Alice inputs two strings
s0, s1 ∈ V and outputs nothing, and Bob inputs c ∈ {0, 1}
and outputs s ∈ {⊥, sc}. Let viewOTAlice(s0, s1; c) denote the
view of an Alice that interacts with an honest Bob. Similarly,
let viewOTBob(s0, s1; c) denote the view of a Bob that interacts
with an honest Alice.
Intuitively, the protocol will be secure for Bob if the view of
Alice does not depend on the choice bit c, and secure for Alice
if Bob cannot obtain any information about s1−c. However this
is tricky to formalize, because a malicious Bob could choose
to play with a different bit, depending on the public random
source and the messages exchanged before any secret is used
by Alice.
In order to have more generality, the main part of the
oblivious transfer protocol is divided in two phase: the setup
phase, which encompass all communication before Alice first
uses her secrets, and the transfer phase, which happens from
that point on. Two pairs of inputs (s0, s1), (s′0, s
′
1) are called
i-consistent if si = s′i for i ∈ {0, 1}. By the end of the setup
phase there should exist a random variable I , such that for
any two I-consistent pairs of inputs, the resulting view of
Bob is statistically close.
Security: A protocol is called (λC, λB, λA)-secure if it satisfies
the following properties:
1) λC-correct: if Alice and Bob are honest, then
Pr [ no aborts and s = sc ] ≥ 1− λC
2) λB-secure for Bob: for any strategy used by Alice,∥∥∥{viewOTAlice(s0, s1; 0)}− {viewOTAlice(s0, s1; 1)}∥∥∥ ≤ λB
3) λA-secure for Alice: for any strategy used by Bob with
input c, there exists a random variable I , defined at
the end of the setup stage, such that for every two I-
consistent pairs (s0, s1), (s′0, s
′
1), we have∥∥∥{viewOTBob(s0, s1; c)}− {viewOTBob(s′0, s′1; c)}∥∥∥ ≤ λA
IV. COMMITMENT PROTOCOLS
In this section we present our three commitment protocols.
There are tradeoffs between the range of noise that could be
tolerated and the round complexity of the proposed protocols.
In short, the first protocol only has one message from Bob to
Alice, but tolerates less noise than the second protocol, which
has more rounds. Both of these protocols impose a memory
bound on Bob, the receiver of the commitment protocol, but
nothing is assumed about the memory capacity of Alice. The
third protocol then deals with the complementary case in
which a memory bound is assumed on Alice, the committer,
but no memory bound is assumed on Bob. Note that in many
scenarios one of the parties is much more powerful than the
other, so it is quite useful to have commitments protocols
working in both directions and just assume a memory bound
on the weaker party.
A. A Simple String Commitment Protocol
Next we present a quite simple string commitment protocol
that only involves one message from Bob to Alice. A memory
bound on Bob is assumed. The scheme works as follows. First,
both parties sample a number of bits from the public source.
Alice then extracts the randomness of her sample and uses
it to conceal her commitment before sending it to Bob. This
guarantees the hiding condition. She also computes a hash of
her sample, where the hash function is chosen by Bob. Alice
sends Bob the concealed commitment along with the hash
value. In the open phase, Alice sends her committed value and
her sampled string. Bob then performs a number of checks for
consistency. These checks enforce binding. The details of the
protocol are presented below.
The security parameter is ` and k is set as k = 2
√
`n in
order to satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.23. Fix ε′ > 0
and let ρ = α− γ− 1+log(1/ε′)n according to the requirements
of Lemma 2.7. To satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.9, fix τ
such that ρ3 ≥ τ > 0, and also fix ω, ζ > 0 such that ρ−3τ >
ω > 2h(δ + ζ) and δ + ζ < 1/2. Let kE = (ρ − 3τ − ω)k
and for ψ > 0, m = (1 − ψ)kE be the parameters of the
strong extractor (Lemma 2.12). The message space is V =
{0, 1}m. It is assumed that the following functionalities, which
are possible due to the lemmas in Section II, are available to
the parties:
• A family G of 2-universal hash functions g : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}ωk.
• A (kE , εE)-strong extractor Ext : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}r →
{0, 1}m, for an arbitrary εE > e−k/2O(log
∗ k)
.
Remark 4.1: Note that it should hold that 2h(δ) < ω+3τ <
ρ < α− γ, so the protocol is only possible if 2h(δ) < α− γ.
Transmission phase:
1) Alice chooses uniformly k positions from X . Similarly,
Bob samples k positions from X˜ . We call their sets of
positions A and B, respectively.
8Commit phase:
1) Alice announces A to Bob.
2) Bob chooses g $← G and sends its description to Alice.
3) Alice computes p ← g(xA), u $← {0, 1}r, and y ←
Ext(xA, u). She then computes z = v ⊕ y and sends
(z, p, u) to Bob in order to commit to v.
Open phase:
1) Alice sends v′ and w to Bob, which are defined as v′ = v
and w = xA in the case that she is honest.
2) Let C = A ∩ B, c = |C| and wC be the restriction of w
to the positions corresponding to the set C. Bob verifies
whether c ≥ `, HD(wC , x˜C) ≤ (δ + ζ)c, p = g(w) and
v′ = Ext(w, u)⊕ z. If any verification fails Bob outputs
0, otherwise he outputs 1.
Theorem 4.2: The protocol is (λC, λH, λB)-secure for λC, λH
and λB negligible in `.
Proof: Correctness: It is clear that if both Alice and Bob
are honest, the protocol will fail only in the case that c < ` or
HD(xC , x˜C) > (δ + ζ)c. By Lemma 2.23, c ≥ ` except with
probability at most e−`/4. By Lemma 2.22, HD(xC , x˜C) ≤
(δ + ζ)c except with probability at most e−cζ
2/2, which is
negligible in ` if c ≥ `.
Hiding: After the commit phase, (a possibly malicious) Bob
possesses (z, p,A, u), g and the output of a function f˜(·) of x˜,
where |f˜(x˜)| ≤ γn with γ < α. The only random variable that
can provide mutual information about V when conditioned on
X˜ is Z, but we prove below that Z is almost uniform from
Bob’s point of view, and so it works as an one-time pad and
only negligible information can be leaked.
By Lemma 2.7,
Rε
′
∞(X|f˜(X˜)) ≥ α− γ −
1 + log(1/ε′)
n
= ρ.
Since Alice chooses A randomly and this is an
(µ, ν, e−kν
2/2)-averaging sampler for any µ, ν > 0 according
to Lemma 2.10. By setting µ = ρ−2τlog(1/τ) , ν =
τ
log(1/τ) , we
have by Lemma 2.9 that
Rε
′′+ε′
∞ (X
A|A, f˜(X˜)) ≥ ρ− 3τ,
where ε′′ is a negligible function of k.
It holds that
Hε
′′+ε′
∞ (X
A|G(XA),A, U,G, f˜(X˜))
= Hε
′′+ε′
∞ (X
A|G(XA),A, f˜(X˜))
≥ Hε′′+ε′∞ (XA|A, f˜(X˜))−H0(G(XA))
≥ (ρ− 3τ − ω)k
= kE .
Therefore, setting ε′ and εE to be negligible in `, the
use of the strong extractor to obtain y (and of y to xor the
message) guarantees that only negligible information about the
committed message can be leaked.
Binding: The protocol is binding if, after the commit
phase, Alice cannot choose between two different values to
successfully open. Let σ = δ + ζ. The only way Alice can
cheat is if she can come up with two strings w,w′ such that
g(w) = g(w′), HD(wC , x˜C) ≤ σc and HD(w′C , x˜C) ≤ σc
(with c ≥ `). If this happens, it holds that either there are
two strings w,w′ such that g(w) = g(w′), HD(w, x˜A) ≤ σk
and HD(w′, x˜A) ≤ σk; or Alice can compute w (without
knowing the set B that together with A determines C) such that
HD(w, x˜A) > σk and HD(wC , x˜C) ≤ σc. It is proven below
that the probability that Alice succeeds in cheating decreases
exponentially with the security parameter ` (or, equivalently in
k, c). First the probability that there exists two different strings
w,w′ both within Hamming distance σk from x˜A and such
that g(w) = g(w′) is upper bounded by
Pr
 ∃w,w′ s.t.

w 6= w′
g(w) = g(w′)
HD(w, x˜A) ≤ σk
HD(w′, x˜A) ≤ σk
 =
=
∑
w : HD(w,x˜A)≤σk
 ∑
w′ 6=w : HD(w′,x˜A)≤σk
2−ωk

≤ 2−(ω−2h(σ))k
where Lemma 2.24 was used to obtain the inequality. By
design, it holds that ω > 2h(σ), therefore the probability that
Alice successfully cheats by finding two strings that are at
distance at most σk from x˜A and hash to the same value is
negligible in k.
Now considering the second case, by assumption w has
Hamming distance (σ+ψ)k from x˜A for some ψ > 0. Since
Bob is honest, B is chosen randomly. Hence Lemma 2.22 can
be applied and thus the probability that HD(wC , x˜C) ≤ σc is
smaller than e−cψ
2/2.
B. Extending the Feasibility Region
While the previous protocol is simple, efficient and round
optimal, it works for a rather limited range of noise: h(δ) <
(α − γ)/2. We next present a more elaborate protocol that
works for a much larger range of noise h(δ) < α − γ at the
cost of increasing the rounds of communication. The memory
bound is still on Bob. The idea for guaranteeing the binding
property is to use two rounds of hash challenge-responses in
order to guarantee the binding condition. Consider the initial
set of viable strings that Alice can possibly send to Bob during
the commitment phase that would pass the Hamming distance
test. The first hash challenge-response round binds Alice to
one specific output of the hash function, and thus restrict the
set of viable strings to be polynomial in the security parameter.
The second hash challenge-response round then binds Alice to
one specific value for the commitment. Our solution is based
on families of 4k-universal hash functions. This approach has
been used before in a different context [23].
The security parameter is ` and k is set as k = 2
√
`n in
order to satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.23. Fix ε′ > 0
and let ρ = α− γ− 1+log(1/ε′)n according to the requirements
of Lemma 2.7. To satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.9,
fix τ such that ρ3 ≥ τ > 0, and also fix ω1, ω2, ζ > 0 such
that ρ − 3τ > ω1 + ω2, ω1 > h(δ + ζ), and δ + ζ < 1/2.
Let kE = (ρ − 3τ − ω1 − ω2)k and for ψ > 0, m = (1 −
ψ)kE be the parameters of the strong extractor (Lemma 2.12).
9The message space is V = {0, 1}m. It is assumed that the
following functionalities, which are possible due to the lemmas
in Section II, are available to the parties:
• A family G1 of 4k-universal hash functions
g1 : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ω1k.
• A family G2 of 2-universal hash functions g2 : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}ω2k.
• A (kE , εE)-strong extractor Ext : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}r →
{0, 1}m, for an arbitrary εE > e−k/2O(log
∗ k)
.
Remark 4.3: Note that it should hold that h(δ) < ω1+3τ <
ρ < α− γ, so the protocol is only possible if h(δ) < α− γ.
Transmission phase:
1) Alice chooses uniformly k positions from X . Similarly,
Bob samples k positions from X˜ . We call their sets of
positions A and B, respectively.
Commit phase:
1) Alice announces A to Bob.
2) Bob chooses g1
$← G1 and sends its description to Alice.
3) Alice computes p1 ← g1(xA) and sends it to Bob.
4) Bob chooses g2
$← G2 and sends its description to Alice.
5) Alice computes p2 ← g2(xA), u $← {0, 1}r, and y ←
Ext(xA, u). She then computes z = v ⊕ y and sends
(z, p2, u) to Bob in order to commit to v.
Open phase:
1) Alice sends v′ and w to Bob, which are defined as v′ = v
and w = xA in the case that she is honest.
2) Let C = A ∩ B, c = |C| and wC be the restriction of w
to the positions corresponding to the set C. Bob verifies
whether c ≥ `, HD(wC , x˜C) ≤ (δ + ζ)c, p1 = g1(w),
p2 = g2(w) and v′ = Ext(w, u)⊕ z. If any verification
fails Bob outputs 0, otherwise he outputs 1.
Theorem 4.4: The protocol is (λC, λH, λB)-secure for λC, λH
and λB negligible in `.
Proof: Correctness: Same as in Theorem 4.2.
Hiding: Follows the same lines as in Theorem 4.2. The
difference is that here kE = (ρ − 3τ − ω1 − ω2)k in order
to account for the entropy loss due to the output of both
hash functions g1 and g2 (instead of kE = (ρ − 3τ − ω)
in Theorem 4.2 that accounts for the output of a single hash
function g).
Binding: The protocol is binding if, after the commit
phase, Alice cannot choose between two different values to
successfully open. Let σ = δ + ζ. The only way Alice
can cheat is if she can come up with two different strings
w,w′ that pass all tests performed by Bob during the opening
phase. Either HD(w, x˜A) ≤ σk and HD(w′, x˜A) ≤ σk;
or Alice can compute w (without knowing the set B that
together with A determines C) such that HD(w, x˜A) > σk
and HD(wC , x˜C) ≤ σc. The probability that Alice succeeds
in cheating in the latter case can be upper bounded as in
Theorem 4.2. Below we upper bound her cheating success
probability in the former case and prove that it decreases
exponentially with the security parameter ` (or, equivalently
in k).
Let the viable set dynamically denote the strings that
Alice can possibly send to Bob with non-negligible proba-
bility of successful opening. Before the first round of hash
challenge-response, the viable set consists of all w such that
HD(w, x˜A) ≤ σk. Now lets consider an arbitrary fixed value
p1 for the output of the first hash. Considering the j-th viable
string before the first hash challenge-response round, define Ij
as 1 if the j-th viable string is mapped by g1 to p1; otherwise
Ij = 0. And define I =
∑
j Ij . Clearly µ = E[I] < 1, as g1
is chosen from a 4k-universal family of hash functions with
range of size {0, 1}ω1k for ω1 > h(δ + ζ). Let p1 be called
bad if I is bigger than 8k + 1. Using the fact that g1 is 4k-
wise independent and applying Lemma 2.25 with t = 4k and
A = 2t = 8k, we get
Pr [ I > 8k + 1 ] < O
((
tµ+ t2
(2t)2
)t/2)
< O
((
1 + t
4t
)t/2)
< O
(
2−t/2
)
.
Then the probability that any p1 is bad is upper bounded
by
O
(
2ω1k2−t/2
)
< O
(
2−k
)
.
If the viable set is reduced to at most 8k+1 elements after
the first hash challenge-response round, then the probability
that some of those collide in the second hash challenge-
response round is upper bounded by
(8k + 1)
2
2−ω2k,
which is negligible in k.
C. Alternative Bit Commitment Protocol
Next we design a bit commitment protocol where the
memory bound is imposed on Alice instead of Bob. The
protocol works for h(δ) < α − γ and uses (the cheaper)
families of 2-universal hash functions, instead of 4k-universal
hash functions. The central idea is to use an interactive hashing
execution to perform the bit commitment [41].
Before describing our solution, we remark that is important
to obtain protocols that work for memory bounded Alice
and protocols that work for memory bounded Bob. This is
particularly interesting in the case of an asymmetry of power
between the parties - when one of the parties is much more
powerful than the other. It makes sense to impose the bound on
the weak party, whenever it is the sender of the commitment
(Alice) or the receiver of the commitment (Bob).
Alice has a bit v which she wants to commit to. The security
parameter is ` and k is set as k = 2
√
`n in order to satisfy the
requirements of Lemma 2.23. Fix ε′ > 0 and ξ > 0 such that
δ+ ξ < 1/2, and let ρ = α− γ− 1+log(1/ε′)n according to the
requirements of Lemma 2.7. Fix 0 < ζ < 1 and τ such that
ρ
3 ≥ τ > 0 to satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.9. Let µ =
10
ρ−2τ
log(1/τ) , ν =
τ
log(1/τ) and ε
′′ = e−`ν
2/2− 2−Ω(τn), where the
last term comes from Lemma 2.9. Fix m ≥ ` (log k + 1) and
m−O(`) ≥ t ≥ m− ζ log(1/(ε′+ ε′′)) according to Lemma
2.17. It is assumed that the following functionality, which is
possible due to the lemmas in Section II-B, is available to the
parties:
• An 2−m-uniform (t, 2−(m−t)+O(logm))-secure interactive
hashing protocol with input domainW = {0, 1}m and an
associated dense encoding of subsets F for tuples of size
k and subsets of size `.
The following bit commitment protocol is correct and secure
if h(δ + ξ) < ρ− 3τ .
Transmission phase:
1) Alice chooses uniformly k positions from X . Similarly,
Bob samples k positions from X˜ . We call their sets of
positions A and B, respectively.
Commit phase:
1) Bob announces B to Alice. Alice computes D = A ∩
B. If |D| < `, Alice aborts. Otherwise, Alice picks a
random subset C of D of size `.
2) Alice computes the encoding w of C (as a subset of
B). Alice and Bob interactively hash w, producing two
strings w0, w1. They compute the subsets C0, C1 ⊂ B
that are respectively encoded in w0, w1. If either encod-
ing is invalid, they abort.
3) Alice sends p = v ⊕ d to Bob, where wd = w.
Open phase:
1) Alice sends v′ and x′C
′
to Bob, which are defined as
v′ = v and x′C
′
= xC in the case that she is honest.
2) Bob computes d′ = p ⊕ v′ and checks whether
HD(x′C
′
, x˜Cd′ ) ≤ (δ + ξ)`. If the verification fails Bob
outputs 0, otherwise he outputs 1.
Theorem 4.5: The protocol is (λC, 0, λB)-secure for λC and
λB negligible in `.
Proof: Correctness: If both participants are honest, the
protocol fails only in the following cases: (1) |D| < `; (2)
HD(xC , x˜C) > (δ+ξ)` or (3) w0 or w1 is an invalid encoding
of a subset. By Lemma 2.23, |D| ≥ ` except with probability at
most e−`/4. By Lemma 2.22, HD(xC , x˜C) ≤ (δ + ξ)` except
with probability at most e−`ξ
2/2. Finally, since wd = w is
the encoding of C, one of the two outputs of the interactive
hashing protocol is always a valid encoding. The other output
W1−d is 2−m-close to distributed uniformly over the 2−m−1
strings different from wd. Since it is a dense encoding,
Lemma 2.19 implies that the probability that it is not a valid
encoding is thus less than or equal to
2−m +
(
k
`
)
2m − 1 ≤ 2
−m + 2` log k−m+1
≤ 2−` log k−` + 2−`+1
≤ 2−`+2,
for m ≥ ` (log k + 1).
Putting everything together this proves the correctness.
Hiding: There are two possibilities: either the protocol does
not abort; or it aborts due to |D| < ` or an invalid encoding.
If the protocol aborts, Alice still has not sent p = v ⊕ d,
so Bob’s view is independent from V . On the other hand, if
the protocol does not abort, then w1−d is a valid encoding of
some set C′. Due to the properties of the interactive hashing
protocol, Bob’s view is then consistent with both
1) Alice committing to v and C being the subset for which
she knows the positions of x, and
2) Alice committing to 1 − v and C′ being the subset for
which she knows the positions of x.
Hence Bob’s view is independent of V .
Binding: The strategy of the proof is to demonstrate that there
is an i such XCi has high enough min-entropy from Alice’s
point of view so that she cannot guess (except with negligible
probability) a string X ′Ci that is close enough to X˜Ci . Hence
she will not be able to successfully use this output of the
interactive hashing during the opening phase and will thus be
bounded to use the other output of the interactive hashing.
By the bounded storage assumption, the bounded information
f(X) stored by Alice is such that |f(X)| ≤ γn with γ < α.
Then, by Lemma 2.7,
Rε
′
∞(X|f(X)) ≥ α− γ −
1 + log(1/ε′)
n
= ρ.
Since Bob is honest, B is randomly chosen. Lets consider
a random subset C˜ of B such that |C˜| = `. This is an
(µ, ν, e−`ν
2/2)-averaging sampler for any µ, ν > 0 according
to Lemma 2.10. By setting µ = ρ−2τlog(1/τ) , ν =
τ
log(1/τ) , we
have by Lemma 2.9 that
Rε
′+ε′′
∞ (X
C˜ |B, C˜, f(X)) ≥ ρ− 3τ,
for ε′′ = e−`ν
2/2 − 2−Ω(τn). For ε˜ = (ε′ + ε′′)1−ζ , let
BAD be the set of C˜’s such that R∞(X C˜ |B, C˜, f(X)) is
not ε˜-close to (ρ − 3τ)-min entropy rate. Due to the above
equation the density of BAD is at most (ε′ + ε′′)ζ . Then
the size of the set T ⊂ {0, 1}m of strings that maps (using
the dense encoding scheme) to subsets in BAD is at most
(ε′ + ε′′)ζ2m ≤ 2t. Hence the properties of the interactive
hashing protocol guarantee that with overwhelming probability
there will be an i such that
Rε˜∞(X
Ci |B, Ci, f(X),MIH) ≥ ρ− 3τ,
where MIH are the messages exchanged during the interactive
hashing protocol.
However, if h(δ + ξ) < ρ− 3τ and the min-entropy rate is
at least ρ − 3τ , then fixing 0 < εˆ < ρ − 3τ − h(δ + ξ), for
large enough `, the probability that Alice guesses one of the
strings X ′Ci that would be accepted by Bob as being close
enough to X˜Ci is upper bounded by
2(h(δ+ξ)−ρ+3τ−εˆ)`,
which is a negligible function of `.
By fixing the parameters as small as possible we have that
for large enough ` the protocol works for values α, γ, δ which
satisfy h(δ) < α− γ.
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V. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER PROTOCOL
Our OT protocol imposes a memory bound on Bob. We
would like to point out that it is trivial to revert the direction
of OT protocols [66]. We first present the intuition behind our
protocol before a detailed description. Initially, both parties
sample positions from the public random source. Then the
parties use an interactive hashing protocol (with an associated
dense encoding) to select two subsets of the positions initially
sampled by Alice. Bob inputs into the interactive hashing
protocol one subset for which he has also sampled the public
random source in the same positions. The other subset is out of
Bob’s control due to the properties of the interactive hashing
protocol. Finally the positions specified by the two subsets are
used as input to a fuzzy extractor in order to obtain one-time
pads. Bob sends one bit indicating which input string should
be xored with which one-time pad. The security for Alice is
guaranteed by the fact that one of the subsets is out of Bob’s
control and will have high min-entropy given his view, thus
resulting in a good one-time pad. The security for Bob follows
from the security of the interactive hashing. The correctness
follows from the correctness of the fuzzy extractor.
The security parameter is ` and k is set as k = 2
√
`n in
order to satisfy the requirements of Lemma 2.23. Fix ε′, εˆ > 0
and ξ > 0 such that 1/4 > δ + ξ > 0 and let ρ = α −
γ − 1+log(1/ε′)n according to the requirements of Lemma 2.7.
Fix 0 < ζ < 1 and τ such that ρ3 ≥ τ > 0 to satisfy the
requirements of Lemma 2.9. Let µ = ρ−2τlog(1/τ) , ν =
τ
log(1/τ)
and ε′′ = e−`ν
2/2− 2−Ω(τn), where the last term comes from
Lemma 2.9. Fix m ≥ ` (log k + 1) and m−O(`) ≥ t ≥ m−
ζ log(1/(ε′+ε′′)) according to Lemma 2.17. For β depending
on δ + ξ (see comments about the code rate below), let kF
and mF (the parameters of the fuzzy extractor) be such that
kF = ρ+ β− 3τ − 2mF − 1− 1+log(1/εˆ)` and 0 < mF < kF .
The message is V = {0, 1}mF `. We assume the following
functionalities are available to the parties (see the lemmas in
Sections II-A and II-B), :
• A pair of functions Ext : {0, 1}`×{0, 1}r → {0, 1}mF `×
{0, 1}q and Rec : {0, 1}`×{0, 1}r×{0, 1}q → {0, 1}mF `
that constitutes an (kF `, εF , δ + ξ, 0)-fuzzy extractor
where q = (1 − R)`, εF is an arbitrary number with
εF > e
−`/2O(log∗ `) .
• An 2−m-uniform (t, 2−(m−t)+O(logm))-secure interactive
hashing protocol with input domainW = {0, 1}m and an
associated dense encoding of subsets F for tuples of size
k and subsets of size `.
Recall (Remark 2.15) that there is a tradeoff between the
fraction of errors δ + ξ that the fuzzy extractor can tolerate
and the rate β of the code used in the construction. The
construction given in Theorem 4 of [46] has linear-time
encoding and decoding and achieves the Zyablov bound [47]:
for given 1 > β > 0 and µ > 0, the code has rate β and
δ + ξ ≥ max
β<β˜<1
(1− β˜ − µ)y
2
, (2)
where y is the unique number in [0, 1/2] with h(y) = 1−β/β˜
and δ + ξ the amount of errors that can be corrected by the
code.
Note that in order for kF to be positive, we need to have
ρ + β > 1; since ρ approaches α − γ from below in the
asymptotic limit, we can obtain an upper bound for δ by setting
β > 1− α+ γ and µ = 0 in Equation (2).
Random linear codes achieve a better bound, namely, the
Gilbert-Varshamov bound: for a given relative distance υ and
µ > 0, a random code has (with high probability) rate β ≥
1 − h(υ) − µ. Applying again the constraint that ρ + β > 1
and that ρ→ α−γ in the asymptotic limit, and using the fact
that a code that can correct δn errors has relative distance υ =
2δ+1/n→ 2δ, this gives an upper bound for δ: we must have
h(2δ) < α−γ. However, as noted in Remark 2.15, the random
linear code construction does not have efficient decoding. It is
an open question whether an efficient construction can achieve
better parameters than the one from [46].
Transmission phase:
• Alice chooses uniformly k positions from X . Similarly,
Bob samples k positions from X˜ . We call their sets of
positions A and B, respectively.
Setup phase:
• Alice sends A to Bob. Bob computes D = A ∩ B. If
|D| < `, Bob aborts. Otherwise, Bob picks a random
subset C of D of size `.
• Bob computes the encoding w of C (as a subset of
A). Alice and Bob interactively hash w, producing two
strings w0, w1. They compute the subsets C0, C1 ⊂ A that
are respectively encoded in w0, w1. If either encoding is
invalid, they abort.
Transfer phase:
• Bob sends p = c⊕ d, where wd = w.
• For i ∈ {0, 1}, Alice picks ri $← {0, 1}r, computes
(yi, qi) ← Ext(xCi , ri) and zi = si⊕p ⊕ yi, and sends
(zi, ri, qi) to Bob.
• Bob computes y′ ← Rec(x˜C , rd, qd) and outputs s =
y′ ⊕ zd.
Theorem 5.1: The protocol is (λC, 0, λA)-secure for λC and
λA negligible in `.
Proof: Correctness: We first analyze the probability of
an abort. The protocol aborts if either |D| < `, or if one
string obtained in the interactive hashing protocol is an invalid
encoding of subsets of A. By Lemma 2.23, Pr[|D| < `] <
e−`/4. Since wd = w is the encoding of C, one of the two
string is always a valid encoding. The other output W1−d is
2−m-close to distributed uniformly over the 2−m − 1 strings
different from wd. Since it is a dense encoding, Lemma 2.19
implies that the probability that it is not a valid encoding is
thus less than or equal to
2−m +
(
k
`
)
2m − 1 ≤ 2
−m + 2` log k−m+1
≤ 2−` log k−` + 2−`+1
≤ 2−`+2,
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for m ≥ ` (log k + 1). If both parties are honest and there is
no abort, then s = sc if and only if Rec(x˜C , rd, qd) = yd.
By the properties of the employed fuzzy extractor, this last
event happens if HD(xC , x˜C) ≤ (δ + ξ)`. By Lemma 2.22,
HD(xC , x˜C) > (δ + ξ)` with probability at most e−ξ
2`/2.
Putting everything together this proves the correctness.
Security for Bob: There are two possibilities: either the
protocol aborts or not. If the protocol aborts in the setup phase,
Bob still has not sent p = c⊕d, so Alice’s view is independent
from C. On the other hand, if the protocol does not abort,
then w1−d is a valid encoding of some set C′. Due to the
properties of the interactive hashing protocol, Alice’s view is
then consistent with both
1) Bob choosing c and C, and
2) Bob choosing 1− c and C′.
Hence Alice’s view is independent of C.
Security for Alice: There should be an index i (determined at
the setup stage) such that for any two pairs (s0, s1), (s′0, s
′
1)
with si = s′i, Bob’s view of the protocol executed with (s0, s1)
is close to his view of the protocol executed with (s′0, s
′
1).
The proof’s strategy is to show that for i, XC1−i has high
enough min-entropy, given Bob’s view of the protocol, in such
a way that Y1−i is indistinguishable from an uniform distri-
bution. Indistinguishability of Bob’s views will then follow.
By the bounded storage assumption, |f˜(X˜)| ≤ γn with
γ < α. Then, by Lemma 2.7,
Rε
′
∞(X|f˜(X˜)) ≥ α− γ −
1 + log(1/ε′)
n
= ρ.
Since Alice is honest, A is randomly chosen. Lets consider
a random subset C˜ of A such that |C˜| = `. This is an
(µ, ν, e−`ν
2/2)-averaging sampler for any µ, ν > 0 according
to Lemma 2.10. By setting µ = ρ−2τlog(1/τ) , ν =
τ
log(1/τ) , we
have by Lemma 2.9 that
Rε
′+ε′′
∞ (X
C˜ |A, C˜, f˜(X˜)) ≥ ρ− 3τ,
for ε′′ = e−`ν
2/2 − 2−Ω(τn). For ε˜ = (ε′ + ε′′)1−ζ , let
BAD be the set of C˜’s such that R∞(X C˜ |A, C˜, f˜(X˜)) is
not ε˜-close to (ρ − 3τ)-min entropy rate. Due to the above
equation the density of BAD is at most (ε′ + ε′′)ζ . Then
the size of the set T ⊂ {0, 1}m of strings that maps (using
the dense encoding scheme) to subsets in BAD is at most
(ε′ + ε′′)ζ2m ≤ 2t. Hence the properties of the interactive
hashing protocol guarantee that with overwhelming probability
there will be an i such that
Rε˜∞(X
C1−i |A, C1−i, f˜(X˜),MIH) ≥ ρ− 3τ,
where MIH are the messages exchanged during the in-
teractive hashing protocol. We now show that XC1−i has
high min-entropy even when given Zi, Yi, Qi. We can see
(Zi, Yi, Qi) as a random variable over {0, 1}(2mF+1−β)`.
Then, by Lemma 2.7,
Rεˆ+
√
8ε˜
∞ (X
C1−i |A, C1−i, f˜(X˜),MIH , Zi, Yi, Qi) ≥
≥ ρ+ β − 3τ − 2mF − 1− 1 + log(1/εˆ)
`
= kF .
Thus setting ε′ and εˆ to be negligible in `, the use of the
(kF `, εF , δ + ξ, 0)-fuzzy extractor to obtain yi that is used as
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Fig. 1. Acceptable levels of noise as a function of α − γ for the oblivious
transfer protocol
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Fig. 2. Acceptable levels of noise as a function of α−γ for the non-interactive
commitment protocol
an one-time pad guarantees that only negligible information
about si⊕e can be leaked and that the protocol is λA-secure
for Alice for negligible λA.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section we briefly discuss the protocols we obtained
in terms of their robustness against noise.
For the case of oblivious transfer, our best protocol works
for levels of noise such that h(2δ) < α−γ. Putting α = 1 and
γ = 0.5 (that means, a public string that is perfectly random
and the bound on the memory equal to half the length of
the publicly available string), we have that oblivious transfer
is possible if δ < 0.055. Figure 1 presents the maximum
supported values of noise for α− γ ranging from 0 to 1.
Our non-interactive commitment protocol works for h(δ) <
(α − γ)/2. For α = 1 and γ = 0.5 we have that non-
interactive commitments are possible in the noisy memory
bounded model if δ < 0.041. Figure 2 presents the maximum
supported values of noise for α− γ ranging from 0 to 1.
Finally, interactive commitments are possible if h(δ) < α−
γ. For the same settings (α = 1 and γ = 0.5), this gives
us a maximum noise rate of δ < 0.11. Figure 3 presents the
maximum supported values of noise for α − γ ranging from
0 to 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we presented the first protocols for commitment
and oblivious transfer in the bounded storage model with
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Fig. 3. Acceptable levels of noise as a function of α− γ for the interactive
commitment protocols
errors, thus extending the previous results existing in the
literature for key agreement [44]. As expected, our protocols
work for a limited range of values of the noise parameter δ.
The allowed range for our commitment schemes is different
than the one for the OT protocol. For the case of commitment
schemes, the range of noise that could be tolerated depended
on the round complexity of the proposed protocols: extra
rounds helped tolerating a more severe noise.
There are many open questions that follow our results here:
• To prove the impossibility of commitment protocols when
h(δ) ≥ α− γ.
• To obtain efficient OT protocols that work for the range of
noise achieved by our protocols based on random linear
codes.
• What is the best range of noise that can be achieved by
non-interactive commitment protocols?
• Is there an intrinsic difference in the level of noise
tolerated by bit commitment and OT protocols?
We do conjecture that there exists an intrinsic difference
between OT and commitment schemes in the sense that there
exist levels of noise so that one of them is possible but not
the other. If this conjecture is proven, this would sharply
contrast with the noise-free bounded memory model, where
there is an all-or-nothing situation: either one has OT and bit
commitment or one has nothing. Our main argument in support
of this conjecture is the need for error correction in the case
of OT protocols in the bounded storage model. In the case of
commitment protocols error correction is not needed, the main
tool used to prevent Alice from cheating is a typicality test.
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A. Smooth Entropies and their Applications in Cryptography
We recall that the conditional min-entropy is defined as
H∞(X|Y ) = min
y∈Y
min
x∈X
(− logPX|Y=y(x))
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for a probability mass function PXY over X × Y .
One faces some difficulties when trying to characterize the
amount of randomness one can extract from X given Y based
on this classical definition of conditional min-entropy. The
first problem is that min-entropy can be highly sensitive (can
change drastically) due to events that occur with a very small
probability. For example, assume that ε is a negligible param-
eter. Consider random variables X over X = {1, . . . , 2`} and
Y over Y = {0, 1}. Intuitively Y can express the occurrence
of some bad event. Let PX|Y (x|y = 0) = 1/|X | for all
x ∈ X , and PX|Y (x = 1|y = 1) = 1. On the one hand,
if PY (y = 1) = 0, then H∞(X|Y ) = `. On the other hand,
if PY (y = 1) = ε is non-zero (even if it is very small value),
then H∞(X|Y ) = 0.
A second problem is that the usual chain rule for entropy,
which holds for the conditional Shannon entropy (H(X|Y ) =
H(XY )−H(X)), does not hold anymore for the conditional
min-entropy as here defined. This makes the use of the
traditional conditional min-entropy quite limited in the context
of randomness extraction and its applications to cryptography.
The same problems are also found with the similarly defined
max-entropy H0(X|Y ).
Smooth entropies solve these problems by “smoothing out”
events that have a small probability. We recall the definition
of conditional smooth min-entropy. For ε > 0, the ε-smooth
min-entropy of X given Y is
Hε∞(X|Y ) = max
X′Y ′:‖PX′Y ′−PXY ‖≤ε
H∞(X ′|Y ′).
for probability mass functions PXY and PX′Y ′ . Thus,
Hε∞(X|Y ) is maximized over all probability distributions that
are ε distant from the original distribution PXY . Going back
to our original example where PX|Y (x|y = 0) = 1/|X | and
PY (y = 1) = ε > 0, we have that Hε∞(X|Y ) = `. Hε∞(X|Y )
is “robust” to any event happening with probability at most ε.
The smooth min-entropy also has the nice property of
having approximate chain rules (that depend on ε).
Lemma 7.1 ([48]): Let ε, ε′, ε′′ > 0 and PXY Z be a
tripartite probability mass function. Then
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X,Y |Z) ≥ Hε∞(X|Y,Z) +Hε
′
∞(Y |Z) and
Hε∞(X,Y |Z) < Hε+ε
′+ε′′
∞ (X|Y,Z) +Hε
′′
0 (Y |Z)
+ log(1/ε′).
It is shown in [48] that the conditional smooth min-entropy
Hε∞(X|Y ) optimally characterizes the amount of randomness
that one can extract from X when Y is given as side
information.
The ε-smooth variants directly allow to capture bad events
that happens with probability at most ε. Another possible
alternative would be to use “average min-entropy”, in which
the min-entropy is averaged over the random variable Y
[45]. In this way, small probability events are naturally taken
care of in the average computation. Moreover, one can also
show that average min-entropy also satisfies an approximate
chain rule [45]. Smooth min-entropy and average min-entropy
are asymptotically identical when applied to independent and
identically distributed distributions.
